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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper employs a newly-available and representative National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) data of South 
African households to investigate whether social grants crowd-out or displace remittances. The estimated results 
based on full sample reveal that while the social grants have a negative impact on the amount of remittances received, 
the effect is statistically insignificant – social grants do not crowd out or displace remittances. The coefficient on the 
social grant is also insignificant in both sub-samples (rural and urban), consistent with the results on the full sample 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ocial grants remain an important source of income for the South African population located at the bottom 
of the income distribution. These grants have proven to be an effective mitigating factor against the South 
Africa’s triple challenge of poverty, inequality and unemployment. Social grants have grown substantially 
in recent years, even as the overall growth on spending slows down. South Africa has a well-developed and large 
social security system by international standards. Social security protection or social grants constitutes 11% of overall 
government expenditure and 15.6 million South Africans are beneficiaries of social grants (Department of Social 
Development 2015). Social security protection consists of Old age pension, Disability grant, and Child support grant 
and Foster care grant. All these grants are subjected to means test mainly based on income and assets of recipients. 
 
 In his recent budget speech, the minister of finance Gordhan announced that social grants allocation will increase 
from R129 billion this year (2016) to R165 billion in 2018/2019. Thus, understanding the impact of these grants and 
how they compare to other sources of income is fundamental to the development process. Various studies in South 
Africa (Jensen 2003; Maitra & Ray 2003; Sienaert 2007; Posel 2016) and other countries (Cox & Jimenez 1992; 
Rosenzweig & Wolpin 1994; Schoeni, 1996; Cutler & Gruber, 1998[Office1]; Attanasio & Rı´osRull 2000; Teruel & 
Davis, 2000; Rasyid 2001[Office2]; Schoeni, 2002; 2003[Office3]; Held & Eur, 2006[Office4]; Dorantes & Juarez, 2013) 
have analysed whether social assistance programs crowd-out private transfers.  
 
We draw on and extend the limited South African literature in two ways. First, we employ a newly-available large 
National Income Dynamics Study (balanced panel data) of South African households observed over the period 2008–
2014, to examine whether social grants or crowd-out remittances. To our knowledge, none of the above mentioned 
South African studies have used a nationally representative panel data (such as NIDS) to analyse crowd-out of private 
transfers.  Secondly, our results are presented for the overall sample (South Africa) and specific subsamples (rural and 
urban) using panel Tobit model.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After a literature overview in section 2, the methodology and 
dataset are discussed in section 3. Section 4 presents the results obtained using descriptive analysis and the panel Tobit 
model. Finally, section 5 provides a conclusion. 
 
  
f 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There is a growing body of empirical literature investigating whether public transfers crowd-out private transfers (see 
for example, Schoeni, 1996; Cutler & Gruber, 1998; Cox et al., 1998[Office5]; Teruel & Davis, 2000; Rasyid, 2001; 
Schoeni, 2002; Maitra & Ray, 2003; Held & Eur, 2006; Dorantes & Juarez, 2013). However, the empirical results 
from these studies remain inconclusive. Some studies have found evidence supporting the crowding-out hypothesis 
(see for example, Dorantes & Juarez, 2013; Jung et al. 2015[Office6], Cox et al., 1998; Held, 2006[Office7]; Cutler & 
Gruber, 1998), while others found no evidence of the crowding-out effect (Oruc, 2011; Verme, 2011[Office8]; Nielsen 
& Olinto, 2007). These inconclusive results are mainly due to different dataset and econometric techniques used in 
the empirical analyses. 
 
In support of crowding-out hypothesis in developing countries, Dorantes and Juarez (2013) used cross-section data 
from the Mexican Income and Expenditure Survey to examine the crowding-out of old age government grant transfers 
on private gifts in rural Mexico. Using OLS and a triple difference approach, Dorantes and Juarez (2013) found that 
a 70 y Más – a public assistance program for the rural elderly in Mexico significantly crowds-out private gifts by 37%. 
 
 In a similar study, Jung et al. (2015) used a national representative Korean Welfare Panel Study (KOWEPS) to 
investigate whether public pensions crowd-out private transfers to elders in South Korea. Using two stage least square 
technique, they found that recipe of public pension had no impact on the total expenditure of elders because public 
transfers significantly crowd-out remittances from adult children and siblings. Specifically, they found that the recipe 
of public pension reduces the probability of receiving remittances by 40%. In support of their results, they argue that 
private transfers in South Korea are driven by altruism motives − elder children remit because they care about the 
well-being of their families – they will therefore reduce the amount of money they remit in respond to their families 
receiving public transfers. 
 
The most cited paper in the literature is a study by Cox et al.  (1998). They tested two motives (Altruism and exchange) 
for private income transfers in Peru using the data from Peruvian Living Standards Survey. They found that due to the 
capital market imperfection social security benefits in Peru crowd-out the incidence of private transfers. Consistent 
with the findings of Jung et al.  (2015), their finding support altruism as an important reason for crowding-out effect. 
 
A number of studies have also found support for crowding-out hypothesis in developed countries (Held, 2006; Cutler 
& Gruber, 1998). A study by Held (2006), investigated the relationship between private and public transfers to and 
from elderly in Germany using 1998 Germany Income and Expenditure survey dataset. Using probit and tobit models 
as estimation techniques, they found that public transfers significantly replaces the amount of transfers that children 
give to their elderly. Held (2006) argued that a failure to not reject the crowding-out hypothesis was as a result that 
public pensions in Germany are regularly received while remittances are irregular source of income hence remitters 
are sensitive to non-pension income. In United State of America, Cutler and Gruber (1998) estimated the extent of 
crowding-out resulting from the expansion of Medicaid to pregnant women and children for the period spanning from 
1987 to 1992. The authors found that a 50% increase in Medicaid coverage was associated with a decrease in private 
insurance coverage. Moreover, the authors further found that employers reduced their contribution for insurance and 
that employees dropped coverage of dependents. 
 
In contrast to the above studies, there are studies that have found no evidence to support the crowding out hypothesis 
(Oruc, 2011; Verme, 2011; Nielsen & Olinto, 2007). Using probit, tobit and two stage Heckman selection models, 
Oruc (2011) investigated whether social transfers crowds-out remittances in Bosnia using the data from wave four of 
‘Living in DIH’ survey dataset. The coefficient of interest (social grants) was positive and insignificant in all the 
models implying that they found no evidence to support the crowding-out hypothesis. In contrast to the findings of 
Jung et al. (2015) they found that remittances in Bosnia are mainly driven by exchange motives. .  
 
Similar to the study of Oruc (2011), Verme (2011) investigated the capacity of public and private transfers to reduce 
poverty in Moldova (poorest country in Europe) using a national representative longitudinal households survey. They 
found that private and public transfers do not crowd-out each other instead there were complements (crowding-in). 
Also Attis–Donfit and Wolff (2000) found that there was a strong positive relationship (crowd-in) between public 
transfers and remittances.  
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In South Africa, many studies that have investigated whether public transfers crowd-out private transfers (see for 
example, Maitra & Ray, 2003; Sienaert, 2007; Jansen[Office9], 2003; Posel, 2016). In their study, Maitra and Ray 
(2003) investigated the effect of transfers on household expenditure patterns and poverty using 1994 South Africa 
Integrated Household survey. They found that public transfers crowd-out private transfers for the poor. As for the non-
poor, they found that private transfer and public transfers were complements. In another study, Jansen (2003)[Office10] 
using Difference-Difference-Difference (DDD) strategy investigated the crowding-out of private transfers by old age 
pension in Venda. They found that old age pension significantly crowd-out private transfers.  Specifically, they found 
that a rand of old pension reduces private transfers by 0.25 to 0.3 cents.  
 
Sienaert (2007) investigated the relationship between remittance and old age pension in Kwazulu-Natal province using 
Kwazulu-Natal Income Dynamic (KIDS) data. Contrary to the findings of Jansen (2003)[Office11], he found that old 
age pension crowd-in remittances. A recent study by Posel (2016) using National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) 
data and finds no evidence of social grants displacing private transfers in South Africa.  
 
Notwithstanding the contribution of the above mentioned studies in South Africa, they have some shortcomings. 
Firstly, most of them are based on cross-sectional dataset, which has some limitation (such as a failure to account for 
heterogeneity of cross sectional units) compared to panel data. Secondly, the findings of other studies (with exception 
to a study by Posel, 2016) are based on one specific area such as a province/homeland (see Sienaert, 2007; Jansen, 
2003)[Office12]. It is therefore difficult to generalize their results to South Africa as a whole. Although Posel (2016) 
used a national representative NIDS panel data, the results are based on descriptive analysis.  
 
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge the above studies are only studies done in South Africa. This is beside the fact 
that South Africa has a large social security and high level of internal remittance. Therefore, the literature on crowding-
out effect of public transfers on private transfers is still under researched in South Africa.   
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCE 
 
We use data from the National Income Dynamics Study (balanced panel data), a nationally representative survey 
carried out every two years by the Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU), based at 
the University of Cape Town’s School of Economics.  Wave 1 of the NIDS was administered in 2008, while the other 
waves were administered in 2010, 2012 and 2014. In addition to the dependent variables (amount of remittances 
received by households), we use several control variables in our econometric analysis. The choice of variables based 
on the previous empirical studies, and the availability of data (see table 1). Specifically, we control for income from 
grants (our variable of interest), head of household age, gender of the household head, household income, asset 
ownership and levels of education, household size, and indicator variables for location of the household—rural or 
urban. 
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Table 1. Explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variables Type Description 
Dependent variable 
Income from remittances  Continuous Received remittances 
Explanatory variables 
Age of HH head Continuous Age of HH head (in years) 
Age SQ Continuous Age squared 
Asset ownership Continuous Amount of asset ownership 
Coloured Dummy 1 = Coloured HH head,0 = Otherwise 
Indian Dummy 1 = Indian HH head, 0 = Otherwise 
White Dummy 1 = White HH head, 0 = Otherwise 
Primary education Dummy 1 = HHH with primary education, 0 = Otherwise 
Secondary education  Dummy 1 = HHH with secondary education, 0 = Otherwise 
Tertiary education Dummy 1 = HHH with tertiary education,0 = Otherwise 
Matric Dummy 1= HHH with matric, 0= Otherwise 
Gender of HH head Dummy 1 = Female, 0 = Otherwise 
Employment status of HHH Dummy 1= Employed 0= Otherwise 
Urban Dummy HH in urban areas 
Farm Dummy HH in farm areas 
Income from grant Continuous Amount received from grants 
Wave_2 Continuous Time specific effects 
Wave_3 Continuous Time specific effects 
Wave_4 Continuous Time specific effects 
Size of HH Continuous Total number of members in HH 
 
 
A great barrier to using survey data is the substantial percentage of households that report zero observation (or zero 
remittances in our case). Such zero remittances should be accommodated to obtain consistent parameter estimates. A 
more suitable approach to deal with data that has too many zeros, is Tobit model, originally developed by Tobin, 
a Nobel laureate economist. The model permits incorporation of all observations including those censored at zero. 
Thus to estimate the effects of social grants on remittances, we used a panel Tobit model where the households with 
zero remittances are censored. This method has been adopted in many previous studies in this field (see Loschmann 
& Siegel 2013; Markova & Reilly 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo 2006; Liu & Reilly 2004; Cox et al. 1998; Brown 
1997; Biyase & Tregenna 2016).  The Panel Tobit can be shown as follow: 
 
௜ܲ௧∗ ൌ ݔଵ௜௧ߚଵ ൅ ߝଵ௜௧			 (1) 
 
where  
 
௜ܲ௧ ൌ ൜	 ௜ܲ௧
∗ , ݂݅ ௜ܲ௧∗ ൐ 0
0, ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁   (2) 
 
Where  ௜ܲ௧∗  is the latent dependent variable observed for values greater than 0, and ௜ܲ is the actual value of remittances. ݔ௜௧ is the vector of household characteristics as defined in Table 1, β is the vector of coefficients to be estimated. 
 
The error term in the panel setting is generally expressed as follows: 
 
ߝଵ௜௧ ൌ ߮௜ ൅ ߤ௜௧ (3) 
 
where  ߮௜ is the unobservable household specific effects and ߤ௜௧ is the unobservable individual and random effects. 
While alternative methods (such a two step Heckman selection model), have been used in the remittance literature, 
there is no theoretical or conceptual underpinnings to suggest that the decision to remit and amount remitted are 
determined by different factors (Loschmann and Siegel 2013). Moreover, Heckman selection model estimates are 
likely to be sensitive to specifications of the selection function (Gubert, 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006). 
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive Analysis 
 
Summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) of the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1. The 
results show some interesting variations in most of the variables. For instance, the mean household remittances were 
high in 2008, it remained stable across the remaining panel years. This is in line with previous studies (Posel 2016) 
which show that remittances are important source of income for the poor households in South Africa especially Black 
Africans. A study by Posel (2016) shows that remittances compromise about 34 and 41 percentage of household 
income and almost 40 percent of households are involved in private transfers.  
 
The average age of the head of household was stable within the mean range of 45 years in both 2008 and 2010, for 
the period 2012 to 2014 it increased from 43.46 to 44.13, respectively. The average household assets remained more 
or less the same for the period 2008 (0.17) and 2014 (0.17). On the other hand, the average household size was pretty 
stable in all the four waves – household size was 5.22 in 2008, 5.64 in 2010, 5.20 in 2012 and 5.18 in 2014.  
 
We use the kernel density function to assess the income impact of remittances and social grants on households’ 
income. The use of the Kernel density function is common in the literature, for example Ray and Maitras 
(2003)[Office13] use the Kernel density function to assess the income impact of social grants on households’ income 
of blacks and non-black households in South Africa. They found that the public transfers and private transfers 
positively affect the income of black household while it does not seem to influence the income of their counterpart 
(i.e. non-black households). Similarly, Posel (2016) used the kernel density function to assess the impact of 
remittances on income of sending and receiving households in South Africa. She found that the remittances were 
important in explaining the incomes for both sending and receiving households. Following similar approach (the 
Kernel density function) we assess whether the remittances are important in explaining income of households for 
South Africa as a whole as well as households living in urban and rural areas.  
 
Figure 1, 2 and 3 present the Kernel density function of a log (income), log (income & remittances) and log (income 
& remittances & grants) for the full sample, urban and rural respectively. Stating with figure 1 (full sample), it is clear 
that remittances shift the entire distribution upward to the right. This implies that remittances have some influence on 
household income. These results are consistent with those found by Ray and Maitras (2003) and Posel (2016). These 
results are expected given the South Africa history of labour migration, which is still dominant today. Moreover, social 
grants further shift the enter distribution to the right, also implying the significant contribution of grants on household 
income. This shows the importance of social grants in reducing poverty in South Africa. Again, this impact is expected 
given the level of poverty and intensity of social grants in South Africa. 
 
Perhaps what is more interesting is a comparison of urban and rural (figure 1 and 2), from these figures the impact of 
remittance and grants in rural is more significant than urban. These results show the dependence of households in rural 
areas on remittances and grants compared to their urban counterparts.  
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Table 2. Summary statistics of variables used in regressions 
 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Variable Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. 
Amount of remittances 2 156 12 303 1 690 3 706 1 627 4 317 1 432 1 621 
HHH_age 45.16 15.11 45.33 15.0 43.46 14.96 44.13 15.38 
HH_assets 0.17 0.37 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.38 
HH_income  2 441 5 282 3 095 23 123 2 708 5 551 3 079 12 551 
HH_size 5.22 3.31 5.64 3.50 5.20 3.26 5.18 3.37 
HHH_empl 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.59 0.49 
HHH_gender 0.39 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.54 0.50 
Coloured 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.078 0.26 
Indian 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 
White 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 
Primary education 0.24 0.423 0.26 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39 
Secondary education 0.32 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.48 0.32 0.47 
Matric education 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38 0.22 0.42 0.150 0.36 
Tertiary education 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.27 0.45 
Farms  0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20 
Urban  0.59 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.62 0.49 
Source: authors’ calculations using NIDS data 
 
 
Figure 1. Kernel density estimates of total household income with and without transfers and grants 
 
Notes: LOG INC=log income, LOG REM= log remittances and LOG GRANTS= log of social grants 
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Figure 2. Kernel density estimates of urban household income with and without transfers and grants 
 
Notes: LOG INC=log income, LOG REM= log remittances and LOG GRANTS= log of social grants 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Kernel density estimates of rural household income with and without transfers and grants 
 
Notes: LOG INC=log income, LOG REM= log remittances and LOG GRANTS= log social grants 
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4.2 Estimation Results 
 
Tables 3 presents the estimated effects of crowding out effects of public transfers (social grants) on the private transfers 
(remittances). As already noted in the previous sections, we employ a panel Tobit specification to examine crowding 
out effects of social grants on the remittances. The analysis was done first for the full sample and then separately for 
the rural and urban localities. The results for the full sample (column 2 of table 3) show that while the social grants 
have a negative impact on the amount of remittances received, the effect is statistically insignificant – social grants 
do not crowd out or displace remittances. These results are consistent with the work of Teruel and Davis (2000) and 
Nielsen and Olinto (2007) and inconsistent with the findings of Jansen (2003)[Office14]. The differences in the results 
could be attributed to the fact that Jensen’s (2003) work is based on cross-sectional data set while ours utilised the 
panel data. 
 
The estimation results for the control variables appear to be largely in line with our expectations and with those in the 
relevant literature. Consistent with our expectations, race dummies (that is, Indian, coloured and white) are 
considerably less likely than their counterpart (i.e. African group) to receive remittances. This is to be expected given 
the history of migration and spatially separated households among Africans in particular. Moreover, compared to 
traditional rural areas (used as reference category), households living in urban and farms are less likely to receive 
remittances. The coefficients of urban and rural are negative and significant at 1% level. Interestingly, the heads of 
households with secondary education and matric received more remittances compared to those with primary education 
and no education. These results are in line with previous studies (Andersson 2014[Office15]). 
 
Having analysed the crowding out effect of public transfers for the full sample, we now examine the effect of social 
grants in urban and rural localities. Column 4 and 6 of table 3 present the results of effect of social grants in urban and 
rural localities. These coefficients on social grants are quite similar to one another (rural and urban) and to the one 
presented in column 2 of table 3 (full sample). Specifically, overall the coefficient of our variable of interest (income 
from grants) is negative as expected but insignificant across all the samples. While the coefficients on social grants 
are quite similar for rural and urban, column (6) shows that the social grant effect on the amount of remittances, is 
larger in absolute value in rural areas.  While the magnitude, direction and significant level of control variables change 
for some variables (education levels, time specific effects – wave 2, wave3 and wave 4, race dummies— Coloured, 
Indian and Whites, across samples, relationships between control variables (such as employment status of the head of 
household and households assets) and remittances don’t change. Our findings are by and large similar with the work 
of Teruel and Davis (2000) and Nielsen and Olinto (2007). 
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Table 3. Panel Tobit estimates of the effects of social grants on remittances, 2008-2014 
 
 Full sample Urban sample Rural sample  
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
Income from grants -0.009506 (0.0000266) -0.0000177 (0.0000354) -0.004500 (3.69E-05) 
HHHage 0.0060002 (0.0070787) -0.0005293 (0.008502) 0.0072399 (0.009305) 
HHHageSQ -0.0000596 (0.0000652) 0.0000197 (0.0000885) -0.0000845 (8.91E-05) 
HHsize -0.0001721 (0.0104022) 0.0195727 (0.0164549) -0.0068729 (0.009421) 
HHemployed -0.0481092 (0.0454291) -0.0532855 (0.0496219) -0.0400538 (0.044421) 
HHFemale -0.0842529 (0.0440522) 0.0968286 (0.0678839) -0.0725783 (0.05771) 
Coloured -0.1683592** (0.0597786) -0.1804643*** (0.0678073) -0.0808053 (0.173777) 
Indian -0.8511753*** (0.2555517) -0.9908936*** (0.3230698) -0.5346679*** (0.208971) 
White -0.4365639* (0.2243714) -0.3278106 (0.2509527) -1.577548*** (0.673076) 
Urban  -0.197183*** (0.0362834) 
Farms -0.3794083*** (0.0698886)   
Primary 0.1027792 (0.0607706) 0.0853689 (0.0994013) 0.09619 (0.052784) 
Secondary 0.2274338*** (0.0654717) 0.2359961*** (0.1186133) 0.2044854*** (0.07168) 
Matric 0.296982*** (0.0880055) 0.4125386*** (0.1439094) 0.1580582 (0.114919) 
Tertiary  0.2958297*** (0.0857324) 0.308936*** (0.1474045) 0.3020321* (0.133911) 
Wave_2 0.5493846*** (0.0797632) 0.5597823*** (0.0977641) 0.5367804*** (0.082392) 
Wave_3 0.5603703*** (0.0601559) 0.6796834*** (0.0898014) 0.4807652 (0.061497) 
Wave_4 0.7608763*** (0.0536354) 0.8209987*** (0.0886288) 0.7110279 (0.062084) 
Households assets -0.0315335 (0.0315128) -0.0038345 (0.0691713) -0.0419392 (0.027674) 
R-square  0.76  0.55  0.69  
Observations  8504  3051  4065  
Notes: Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Within the literature on the relationship between private financial support and public transfers, the dominant conjecture 
is that public transfers crowd-out or displace private financial support. The goal of this article has been to contribute 
and present an important value-added in this field by empirically assessing whether social grants crowd-out or displace 
remittances in South Africa using the panel Tobit model and a newly-available and representative National Income 
Dynamics Study data (for the period 2008–2014). Moreover, the analysis was performed for the overall sample and 
specific subsamples (rural and urban).  
 
The results for the full sample (column 2 of table 3) shows that while the social grants have a negative impact on the 
amount of remittances received, the effect is statistically insignificant – social grants do not crowd out or displace 
remittances in South Africa. Interestingly, the coefficient of social grant was also found to be negative and insignificant 
in both sub-samples (rural and urban), consistent with the results on the full sample. These results are consistent with 
the work of Teruel and Davis (2000) and Nielsen and Olinto (2007) and Posel (2016). The estimation results for the 
control variables appear to be largely in line with our expectations and with those in the relevant literature. Consistent 
with our expectations, race dummies (that is, Indian, coloured and white) are considerably less likely than their 
counterpart (i.e. African group) to receive remittances. Moreover, compared to traditional rural areas (used as 
reference category), households living in urban and farms are less likely to receive remittances. The coefficients of 
urban and rural are negative and significant at 1% level. Although this study focused on the effects of social grants on 
remittances, a number of additional investigations, clarifying these effects and the appropriate policy responses for 
governments and remitters, may be answered in further research. Future studies may examine separately the impact 
of any specific social grants, (such as old age pension, child support grant, disability grants) on private transfers. 
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